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AbstrAct
This paper reexamines some examples, dis-
cussed by Mates and others, of sentences con-
taining both definite descriptions and quanti-
fiers. It has frequently been claimed that these 
sentences provide evidence for the view that 
definite descriptions themselves are quantifiers. 
The main goal of this paper is to argue this is not 
so. Though the examples are compatible with 
quantificational approaches to definite descrip-
tions, they are also compatible with views that 
treat definite descriptions as basically scope-
less. They thus provide no reason to see definite 
descriptions as quantifiers. Even so, this paper 
shows that the examples do raise a surprising 
range of complex issues about how quantifier 
scope works, and where it occurs. Thus, a clear 
picture of how these examples work will help us 
to understand better where definite descriptions 
fit into the larger picture of quantifiers and re-
lated phenomena. 
Key words: definite description, quantifier, 
scope, semantics, syntax.
My goal in this paper is to reexamine two sentences that have played a 
significant role in the discussion of defi-
nite descriptions: 
(1) The mother of each girl waved to her.
(2) The woman every Englishman loves 
is his mother. 
sentences like these have been around for 
some time. sentences like (1) have been 
discussed by Mates (1973), and by Ev-
ans (1979). sentences like (2) were made 
prominent by Geach (1964, 1969), and 
were likewise discussed by Mates, and 
many others. More recent work of Neale 
(1990) has drawn attention to the impor-
tance of these sorts of examples for the 
theory of definite descriptions. (The par-
ticular formulations of these examples I 
use here are Neale’s.)
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I shall reach a negative conclusion about these examples: they do not show as much 
about definite descriptions as they may have appeared to show. In particular, they do 
not provide good reasons for treating definite descriptions as quantifiers.
Along the way, I shall show how these examples raise a surprising range of complex 
issues; both philosophical, and as I shall concentrate on here, linguistic. This itself will 
show us something about the theory of descriptions. One might marvel, more than 
one hundred years after the appearance of russell’s “On Denoting” (1905), and with 
thousands of pages written on the topic since, how we can still be debating whether 
descriptions are quantifiers. The detailed and linguistically informed examination of 
examples (1) and (2) I shall offer here will shed some light on why this issue remains 
open. It will make vivid how deciding this issue requires answering some very difficult 
and fundamental questions. Particularly, it will make vivid how deciding it requires an-
swering some difficult and fundamental questions about how quantifier scope works, 
and where it occurs. It is not at all surprising that we have not answered all these ques-
tions, and until we do, some issues about descriptions will remain elusive.
My discussion of examples (1) and (2) will proceed as follows. In section 1, I shall lay 
out what is at stake for the examples. In section 2, I shall present some background 
material on semantics, syntax, and the interpretation of descriptions we will need to 
examine them in detail. I shall then turn to the examples themselves. I shall discuss ex-
ample (1) in section 3, and example (2) in section 4. finally, in section 5, I shall return 
briefly to the general issue of what counts as taking scope.
1. Refining the issue
sentences like (1) and (2) have frequently been taken to tell us something important 
about definite descriptions. to see why, consider russellian accounts that treat definite 
descriptions as a kind of quantifier, including the refined version of Neale (1990) which 
treats them as restricted quantifiers. One might be skeptical about such theories, based 
on the following sort of observation.
One of the distinguishing features of quantifiers is their ability to take scope with re-
spect to other quantifiers, i.e. to take relative scope. Indeed, it is a commonplace as-
sumption in much of the literature in philosophical logic that quantifiers are quite free 
in their scope potentials with other quantifiers. In a sentence with multiple quantifiers, 
this in turn predicts there will be scope ambiguities. for instance, we expect to see two 
different readings for a sentence like: 
(3) someone loves everyone.
 a. surface scope: ∃x ∀y L(x,y)
 b. Inverse scope: ∀y ∃x L(x,y)
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Though it not uncontroversial, this certainly seems right. The sentence appears to be 
ambiguous, and the ambiguity appears to be the result of the quantifiers being able to 
enter into distinct scope relations with each-other.1
When we turn to definite descriptions, we see a strikingly different pattern. similar 
sentences with definite descriptions do not appear ambiguous. consider: 
(4) a. Every man danced with the woman.
b. The woman danced with every man.
c. The woman danced with some man.
d. The woman danced with the man.
In none of these cases do we detect any ambiguity. This is first and foremost a point of 
data. We simply do not perceive these sentences as ambiguous, as we do with (3). On 
this point, definite descriptions are not behaving the same way as canonical quantifiers. 
It is tempting to infer from such data that definite descriptions are not quantifiers.
Examples like (1) and (2) might be offered as a reason to reject this conclusion. In them, 
we see descriptions interacting with other quantifiers, in ways we do not in (4). In par-
ticular, as Neale (1990) stresses, we see definite descriptions appearing to take narrow 
scope with respect to other quantifiers which are below them in the surface forms of 
the sentence in which they occur. We seem to have each girl scoping over the mother 
and every Englishman scoping over the woman. from this, we might infer that definite 
descriptions enter into typical quantifier-scope behavior. Hence, we might conclude, 
definite descriptions look like quantifiers after all.
My main point in this paper is that cases like (1) and (2) do not show this. They show 
us lots of interesting things about quantifier scope; both where we see it, and where we 
do not. but they do not show us anything particularly interesting about the scoping 
behavior of definite descriptions themselves. As far as the status of quantificational ac-
counts of definite descriptions go, they are not really helpful.
before launching into my arguments for this conclusion, it is worth pausing to explore 
in some more detail what is at stake for our examples, and what my conclusions might 
really reveal. 
first, let me make clear that my negative conclusion is only one about whether definite 
description take relative scope with respect to other quantifiers. This should be sharply 
distinguished from the issue of whether we can bind into the nominal of a definite de-
scription, as we see with another of Mates’ examples: 
1 I shall not here seriously worry about whether this sentence is ambiguous. Virtually any discussion in philo-
sophical logic will assume it is. A number of linguistic theories of quantifier scope will too, including such works 
as Aoun & Li (1993) and May (1985). reasons to doubt it is really ambiguous have been offered by such works 
as kempson & cormack (1981) and reinhart (1979, 1983). A careful critique of some of their arguments can be 
found in chierchia & Mcconnell-Ginet (1990). Alternative reasons to cautious about claims of scope ambiguity 
can be found in Pietroski & Hornstein (2002).
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(5) Every positive integer is the positive square root of some positive integer.
As Mates rightly notes, because the definite description contains a pronoun bound by 
the quantifier every positive integer, there is no single value of the definite description. 
Hence, we cannot think of it as simply an unstructured referring expression, picking 
out a single object. This is serious objection to the kind of view held by strawson (1950), 
but it is not enough to convince us that definite descriptions are really themselves quan-
tifiers.
second, the examples in (3) and (4) provide data about scope interaction; especially, 
about the possibility of inverse scope readings. but such data is not by itself conclusive 
for questions of what counts as a quantifier. Not every quantifier in every position can 
take inverse scope. for instance, quantifiers like few in object position do not generally 
allow inverse scope readings. consider: 
(6) Three referees read few abstracts.
This sentence appears to be unambiguous.2 Hence, one might shrug off data like (4) as 
simply showing unusual scope potentials for definite descriptions.
Even so, I think there is a serious issue at stake, and appreciating just what sentences 
like (1) and (2) tell us will help to illuminate it. Examples like (4) hold out the prospect 
of treating definite descriptions as essentially scopeless, on par with proper names and 
deictic pronouns when it comes to scope. Examples like (5) remind us that we will have 
to allow some functional dependence in the values of definite descriptions, but do not 
really show us that we need to see definite descriptions themselves as taking scope. On 
the other hand, if scoping mechanisms really do have to apply to definite descriptions 
to make sense of examples like (1) and (2), then we have a conclusive refutation of any 
view which treats them as basically scopeless. As quantifiers are our best examples of 
scope-taking operators, we would thereby have strong support for the quantificational 
treatment of definite descriptions.
I shall argue here that as far as sentences like (1) and (2) go, we have no need for scoping 
mechanisms to applying to definite descriptions. Hence, they do not give support for 
quantificational views. This conclusion is quite limited for many reasons. first, there 
are any number of other reasons russellians have offered for treating definite descrip-
tions as quantifiers, so ruling out this one is hardly conclusive. I shall not, for instance, 
discuss at all the issues of scope interaction with modality or belief which have loomed 
so large in the literature on definite descriptions.3 second, there are some very delicate 
issues of just what counts as taking scope which examination of these sentences will not 
address. (I shall return to this issue briefly in section 5.)
2 Examples like this are discussed by beghelli & stowell (1997), Liu (1997), and szabolcsi (1997), among places.
3 I do take up the issue of scope with negation in my (forthcoming).
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Even so, I do think that focusing on these examples shows more than just that one data 
point in favor of russellian views does not work out. The issues that are required to un-
derstand the ways the quantifiers work in sentences like (1) and (2) invoke a surprising 
amount of important and far-reaching theory. Understanding them involves under-
standing some very important aspects of quantifier scope, and of distinct phenomena 
that may appear to be quantifier scope. Thus, a clear picture of how these examples 
work will help us to understand better where definite descriptions fit into the larger 
picture of quantifiers and related phenomena.
2. Some background
The main task at hand is to examine (1) and (2) in detail. to do this, some tools and 
background assumptions will be necessary. some of what we will need will be fairly 
technical ideas from linguistic theory. so, I shall now try to give a crash course in some 
key aspects of the syntax and semantics of quantifiers, and review some key ideas about 
the semantics of definite descriptions.
2.1. Semantic and syntactic assumptions
I shall adopt a reasonably standard approach to semantics in linguistic theory: the one 
represented by the textbook of Heim & kratzer (1998). This will give us an off-the-shelf 
framework for semantic analysis. It is not the only one available, but I am broadly sym-
pathetic to the framework of model-theoretic semantics in which they work.4
One of the hallmarks of contemporary model-theoretic semantics is reliance on the 
machinery of type theory. types provide a classification of semantic values, which I 
shall rely upon here. (Actually, they provide much more than that, and where they do, 
their use is controversial.) We begin with a type e of individuals. ‘e’ names an entire 
type, whose elements are elements of the domain De of individuals. We also begin with 
a type of truth values t, whose elements are the two truth values 1 and 0. Hence, Dt = 
{1,0}.
further types are built as types of functions between types already constructed. for in-
stance, we have a type of functions from individuals to truth values, which is essentially 
the type of sets of individuals. This type is named 〈e, t〉, the angle brackets indicating 
functions from the left-hand type to the right-hand type. 〈e, t〉 is the type of elements 
of DtDe. We can also consider more complicated types. 〈〈e, t〉, t〉 is the type of functions 
from functions from individuals to truth values (i.e. sets) to truth values. It is thus es-
sentially the type of sets of sets.
4 The model-theoretic approach to semantics stems from Montague (e.g. Montague 1973). The leading alternative 
stems from Davidson (e.g. Davidson 1967). An alternative to Heim and kratzer’s textbook presentation, in the 
Davidsonian tradition, is Larson & segal (1995).
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The taxonomy of types corresponds to some basic grammar. Pronouns, proper names, 
and variables will be interpreted as of type e. Intransitive verbs are predicates, and are 
interpreted as of type 〈e, t〉. for a transitive verb, we have a simple syntax like: 
(7) [s [DP John] [VP [V loves] [DP Mary] ] ]
The sentence (s) is broken into a verb phrase (VP) and various arguments. tradition-
ally, these are though of as noun phrases, but current thinking tends to classify then as 
determiner phrases (DP). The type-theoretic representation of the verb loves reflects 
the way it combines with its arguments in this simple syntax. Order counts. It first 
combines with the object determiner phrase (DP) Mary to form the verb phrase (VP) 
loves Mary. This then combines with the subject to form a sentence. Hence, the seman-
tic value of the verb needs to take an argument of type e, and result in a predicate, i.e. 
needs to be of type 〈e, t〉. The semantic value of a verb like loves, written [[ loves]] is thus 
an element of type 〈e, 〈e, t〉〉.5
Quantified expressions in natural language are a species of determiner phrases (DPs). 
Among the determiners are some fairly uncontroversial quantifiers, including every, 
most, few, no, some, etc. These build quantified DPs by combining with a nominal, 
which may be a common noun, as in every man or something more syntactically com-
plex, as in most men who have been to California.6
The standard semantics for quantified DPs makes them of type 〈〈e, t〉, t〉. This incor-
porates the fregean idea that quantifiers are interpreted as sets of sets. [[ Every man]] is 
basically {X: {y: man(y)} ⊆ X}. Every man is happy is true if and only if {y: happy(y)} ∈ 
[[ every man]]. In type-theoretic parlance, this is a function which inputs sets, and out-
puts 1 if the input set includes every man. Hence, we have an element of type 〈〈e, t〉, t〉. 
Quantifying determiners are functions from nominal inputs to quantifiers of type 〈〈e, 
t〉, t〉. Hence, they are of type 〈〈e, t〉, 〈〈e, t〉, t〉〉.7
In this framework, the genuine arguments of predicates (e.g. Vs) are expressions of type 
e. This is built into the assignment of type 〈e, t〉 to an intransitive verb, for instance. We 
are assuming that such expressions as pronouns and proper names can occur as type e, 
and figure as arguments. 
Quantifiers cannot generally figure as arguments, as they are not of type e. In particular, 
quantified DPs in object position cannot combine with a V. One reason they cannot is 
5 [[ α]] is the semantic value of α (in a given context). I shall generally be somewhat lax about use and mention, and 
for instance, call a quantified expression like every boy and its semantic value [[ every boy]]  both quantifiers. Where I 
do need to keep more track of use and mention, I shall put linguistic expressions in italics. specific semantic values 
will be in bold, so we have, for instance, [[ John]] = John.
6 I shall also be lax about referring both to a quantifying determiner and a DP built out of a quantifying determiner 
as ‘quantifiers’.
7 This approach to the semantics of quantifiers essentially goes back to frege (e.g. frege 1879), and has been 
developed extensively by barwise & cooper (1981), Higginbotham & May (1981), keenan & stavi (1986), and 
Montague (1973), among many others. A philosophically oriented survey of this literature is given in my (2006).
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that their types do not match. A quantifier is of type 〈〈e, t〉, t〉, while a V is of type 〈e, 〈e, 
t〉〉. Neither makes sense as the argument of the other, so we have no way to combine 
them.
This is one of many reasons to posit underlying logical forms (Lf) for sentences which 
look substantially different from surface syntax. The basic idea is to see quantifiers as 
binding a variable (as we do in standard logic). A variable, rather than the quantifier 
itself, occupies the argument position of a verb, while the quantifier has moved to the 
front of the sentence, and binds the variable. The Lf of a sentence like John offended 
every student is then given by: 
(8) a. John offended every student..
 b. [s [DP every student]x [s John offended x] ]
The framework of Heim and kratzer is very careful about the mechanism by which the 
variable is bound. technically, binding is done by λ-abstraction. They propose that the 
process of moving a quantifier, which is exhibited by (8), introduces such a binder. The 
full Lf for (8) in their framework is given by: 
(9) 
The types now match, and the sentence can be assigned a semantic value composition-
ally.8
The notion of logical form that is common in linguistics is importantly different from 
the one often used by philosophers. The idea that sentences have Lfs with certain fea-
tures is a substantial empirical hypothesis. The claim is not merely that we can make 
certain features of a sentence perspicuous by representing it with the apparatus of logic, 
but that the grammar itself generates such a structure, even if it is not the same as the 
8 I am abusing use and mention again here. technically, we should have an index interpreted by λ-abstraction 
where I have simply a λ. The explicit presence of the λ-binder is a feature of Heim and kratzer’s system which is 
not common to all similar views of logical form. see büring (2004) for further discussion of this apparatus.
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apparent surface structure of the sentence. The need to repair type mismatches is one of 
many reasons that have been given over the years for positing such a level of linguistic 
representation.9
With the notion of logical form goes that of the syntactic process that generates logi-
cal forms: particularly, the syntactic process of moving a quantified DP. for instance, 
in (9) the quantifier is moved from its position in the surface form of the sentence to 
a sentence-initial position. This process is known as quantifier raising (Qr). As Lf is 
taken to be a genuine level of linguistic representation, Qr is taken to be a genuine part 
of grammar.10
One of the important features of Lf as we are considering it is that it makes scope 
a substantially syntactic matter. Arguments—non-scope-taking elements—are inter-
preted in situ. Quantifiers—canonically scope-taking—are generally interpreted after 
being moved by Qr, leaving variables in genuine argument positions. Qr generates a 
syntactic scope configuration. We see: 
(10)
scope positions are syntactic positions like these, where a quantified expression is ad-
joined by Qr to a syntactic domain (plus a λ-binder). The syntactic structure to which 
it is adjoined is its scope. It is also the semantic scope of the λ-binder. We thus have 
syntactic notion of scope, and a syntactic operation that assigns scope.11
9 The notion of logical form I shall appeal to, in keeping with my use of Heim & kratzer (1998) as a basic frame-
work, is very commonplace in linguistics. commonplace does not mean universally accepted or uncontroversial. 
There is an active research program which does not accept it (e.g. cooper 1983; Hendriks 1993; Jacobson 1999). A 
battery of arguments in favor of logical form as a level of linguistic representation may be found in the classic May 
(1985). for a somewhat more recent discussion, see Huang (1995).
10 Not surprisingly, this idea has been challenged, especially by minimalist approaches to syntax (e.g. Hornstein 
1995). Another alternative, developed by beghelli & stowell (1997), retains some but not all aspects of the Qr ap-
proach. see szabolcsi (2001) for a survey of these issues.
11 The syntactic relation involved here is that of c-command. As pointed out by reinhart (1979, 1983), this is 
the fundamental syntactic notion behind scope. It is controversial whether the right syntactic configuration fully 
determines scope; or whether, as argued by May (1985), it only constrains scope. I shall adopt the former as a 
working hypotheses, but really only for simplicity of exposition. It will not significantly affect the arguments I 
shall offer here.
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The machinery that I have been reviewing indicates a clean and simple picture of the 
issues that will be at stake for us. We have a distinction between quantified expressions 
of type 〈〈e, t〉, t〉 and non-quantified expressions of type e. e-type expressions occur 
in argument positions at Lf. Quantified expressions, on the other hand, are moved to 
scope positions at Lf. Their scopes are fixed (at least in part) by the syntactic proper-
ties of their scope positions. Hence, e-type expressions are essentially scopeless, while 
quantifiers are essentially scope-taking.
Unfortunately, the situation is not really as simple as this. At least, it is not at all clear 
that it is. There are any number of complications which might interfere with the clean 
and simple picture. I shall mention some of them.
first, deciding which expressions are genuinely of type e is not so straightforward. A 
moment ago I listed proper names as of type e. but it is possible to treat them quantifier 
type (following Montague 1973), and it is sometimes argued that we should.12 Whether 
or not some pronouns should be interpreted as having quantifier type is a large issue in 
the anaphora literature.
Perhaps more importantly, the simple picture which has quantifiers as always moving 
to scope positions and e-type expressions never moving glosses over some significant 
issues. In fact, it is clear from (9) that quantifiers in subject position can be interpreted 
in situ in the Heim and kratzer framework. This is allowed, as the semantic value of 
the VP of type 〈e, t〉 can be an argument of the semantic value of the quantifier of type 
〈〈e, t〉, t〉. This inverts the intuitive picture of what is argument and what is predicate, 
but it is allowed by the type-driven framework. Whether or not this right syntactically 
remains a difficult question.13
Likewise, the simple picture which has e-type expressions uniformly interpreted in situ 
is also an over-simplification. Though the type-driven framework of Heim and kratzer 
allows such expressions to be interpreted in situ, it does not require it. Nothing in the 
framework precludes applying Qr to e-type expressions, and in fact Heim and kratzer 
allow it. Whether or not e-type expressions can or must move to scope positions also 
remains a difficult question. As I shall briefly touch upon in section 5, far more bears 
upon it than what is needed to fix relative quantifier scopes.
Even in light of all these complications, the clean and simple picture helps us to give 
substance to the question of whether or not descriptions are quantifiers. Whether or 
not we can interpret definite descriptions as type e remains a substantive question, 
and it is that question we will focus on here. complications not withstanding, expres-
sions of type e can typically occur as arguments, and obviate some requirements for 
12 One such argument is in effect given by Larson & segal (1995).
13 for instance, in May (1985), a version of the θ-criterion requires all quantifiers to move at Lf. In contrast, in 
Hornstein (1995), minimalist principles allow at least weak determiner phrases to be interpreted in situ (inside 
the VP shell).
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movement to scope position, while quantified DPs typically cannot be arguments, and 
typically must move to scope positions to produce interpretable structures. Hence, ex-
amining whether an expression may be interpreted as type e and left in situ is a good 
way to explore whether it really behaves like a quantifier. With this in mind, at least for 
simplicity of exposition, I shall frequently pretend the clean and simple picture holds as 
we explore our examples (1) and (2).
2.2. Semantics for definite descriptions
With this background in place, we may consider some alternatives for interpreting the 
definite article the of English.
A number of theses surrounding the interpretation of descriptions need to be distin-
guished. One thesis is about the truth conditions of sentences with descriptions. com-
pare: 
(11) a. The F is G
 b. ∃x (F(x) ∧∀y (F(y) → x = y) ∧ G(x))
russell argued that the truth conditions of (11a) are given by (11b). At least when it 
comes to proper definite descriptions, for which there is a unique F, this is widely ac-
cepted, and I shall not challenge it.
russell’s own view of definite descriptions made them syncategorematic: there is no 
constituent in the logical form of a sentence corresponding to the definite article ac-
cording to russell.14 Modern neo-russellian theories of descriptions, such as those of 
sainsbury (1979), sharvey (1969), and most prominently Neale (1990), generally do 
not accept this. Neale (1990), for instance, proposes logical forms involving restricted 
quantifiers for sentences containing descriptions. The logical form of (11a) is given by: 
(12) [the x: F(x)] G(x)
The truth conditions of this form are still as they are given in (11b).
This idea fits entirely naturally with the framework I just sketched. restricted quanti-
fiers are just quantified DPs. The truth conditions given in (11b) can be captured by: 
(13) [[ the F]] = λX ∈ D〈e, t〉 [|F| = 1 ∧ |F \ X| = 0]
On this view, the is a quantifying determiner, with the same semantics of type 〈〈e, t〉, 〈〈e, 
t〉, t〉〉 as any other quantifying determiner. I shall take this to encapsulate the treatment 
of definite descriptions as quantifiers.
14 russell (1905, 1919) offers a theory which associates a sentence with a logical form that does not contain any 
constituent directly corresponding to the definite article. In Whitehead & russell (1927), descriptions are directly 
introduced as defined symbols of a formal language.
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Especially in the linguistics literature, the quantificational approach to definite descrip-
tions is one among several competitors. Most of the alternatives have the feature of 
making DPs headed by the definite article of the same semantic type as pronouns and 
variables (with the notable exception of Graff 2001). In light of the background theory 
I sketched in section 2.1, we can say that these theories make definite descriptions of 
type e, and treat them as basically scopeless.
I shall present one such theory, for comparison’s sake. The one I shall present is in 
some ways similar to the quantificational treatment. It treats the F as a semantically 
structured phrase, whose nominal F is interpreted as a predicate in the usual way. but 
instead of making the phrase of type 〈〈e, t〉, t〉, of quantifier type, it makes it of type e, 
simply picking out an individual. The way to do this is to make the of type 〈〈e, t〉, e〉: 
(14)
It is important to stress that for proper definite descriptions, where there is exactly 
one F, (13) and (14) give exactly the same truth conditions to The F is G. but they do 
so in different ways. On the russellian treatment of (13), the DP the F is treated as a 
quantified DP, of quantifier type 〈〈e, t〉, t〉. On the treatment of (14), it is of type e, on 
par with proper names and pronouns. Unlike proper names and pronouns, however, 
it is semantically structured (and non-rigid). It results from the composition of the〈〈e, t〉, 
e〉 and F〈e, t〉.
As DPs with the definite article are interpreted as of type e, we may call this the e-type 
theory. The e-type theory of definite descriptions in (14) is one of several that are much-
discussed in the linguistics literature. Another category of approaches relies on dynamic 
logic or discourse representation theory (Drt), as in the seminal works of Groenendijk 
& stokhof (1991), Heim (1982), and kamp (1984). The hallmark of these sorts of theories 
is the treatment of both definites and indefinites as free variables, which are bound by 
an existential closure operation which functions outside of clausal domains. It is by no 
means my goal here to argue that the e-type theory is superior to Drt-based approaches. 
That is a large issue, with a literature all its own. The e-type theory is structurally similar 
to the quantificational one, and so it facilitates comparison. As I mentioned, these all have 
the feature of making definite descriptions of a semantic type suitable for occupying an 
argument position. Hence, descriptions on these views can be interpreted without mov-
ing them to scope positions. They are thus, as I have been saying, basically scopeless.15
15 The e-type theory is is so-called because of the type assigned to definite descriptions. It should be distinguished 
from E-type anaphora, even though some accounts of E-type anaphora do assume it (e.g. Heim 1990). It is also 
sometimes called the ‘fregean’ theory, e.g. by Heim (1991), Heim & kratzer (1998), Elbourne (2005), and my 
(forthcoming). The idea does essentially go back to frege (1893). I prefer to simply call it the e-type theory, as 
many philosophers assume a ‘fregean’ theory involves fregean senses.
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2.3. Presupposition
The e-type analysis of descriptions I gave in (14) makes the semantic value of the F un-
defined if there is no unique F. This makes definite descriptions carry a presupposition 
of existence and uniqueness. Whether definite descriptions carry such presuppositions 
is highly controversial. Even so, I do not think this controversy significantly affects the 
issues at stake here, for two reasons.
first, and most importantly, virtually everything I shall say here about descriptions and 
scope is independent of what we say about presupposition. The important issues about 
scope appear with proper definite descriptions, where the quantificational analysis (13) 
and the e-type analysis (14) agree on truth conditions.
second, though the simple way of presenting an e-type analysis I opted for in (14) 
makes definite descriptions carry presuppositions, this can be avoided. One way to do 
so is to fix that The F is G is false if the description is improper.16 conversely, it is not dif-
ficult to write semantic presuppositions into the interpretations of quantifiers, and we 
could do so for a quantifier which otherwise functions like (13).17 Thus, both quantifi-
cational and e-type approaches can have either either presuppositional or non-presup-
positional meanings for the. This makes the issue of presupposition largely orthogonal 
to the ones we will explore here.
bearing this in mind, I shall generally try to avoid issues of presupposition in the dis-
cussion to follow. Though I am inclined to believe that the presuppositional analysis is 
correct, it will not be at issue here.18
3. The inverse linking case
We now have a rather heavy bag of machinery at our disposal. Let us use it to see how 
sentences (1) and (2) may be analyzed, and how the e-type approach to definite de-
scriptions fares in them.
I shall start with (1). As I shall discuss more in a moment, this is an instance of the 
phenomenon discussed in the linguistics literature under the name of ‘inverse linking’. 
16 Just how to do this involves some technical complications, but as I am avoiding issues of presupposition as much 
as possible, I shall not pause to pursue them. They are discussed, for instance, in some of the literature on choice 
functions, including reinhart (1997) and Winter (1997). (This literature, of course, is generally more concerned 
with indefinite than definite descriptions.) Also, van Eijck (1993) makes extensive comparisons between presup-
positional and non-presuppositional treatments of descriptions, from the point of view of dynamic semantics.
17 Examples of quantifying determiners which fairly clearly seem to carry presuppositions include both and nei-
ther.
18 It should be clear that assuming a presuppositional analysis of the is not to endorse all aspects of the theory of 
strawson (1950). Among the many issues that have been controversial for presuppositional approaches is just what 
a realistic uniqueness presupposition should look like. The literature on the uniqueness of definites is huge. some 
snapshots are to be found in Abbot (2004) and kadmon (2001), among many places.
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to get an analysis of it, we should start with a rough (very rough indeed! ) approxima-
tion of what the surface syntax of our target sentence is like. closely enough, we can 
treat it as: 
(15) [s [DP the [NP mother [PP of each girl ] ] ] [VP waved to her ] ]
Working with this structure, how are we to interpret the sentence? 
Let us begin with the NP mother of each girl. Mother is a two place relation [[ mother]] 〈e, 〈e, t〉〉. 
The PP of each girl appears as an argument of the relation mother. Hence, the preposi-
tion of is semantically vacuous, and the PP contributes the quantified DP [[ each girl]] 〈〈e, t〉, t〉. 
We thus have a type mismatch: the values of mother and of each girl cannot compose to 
give us the semantic value of the NP mother of each girl.
As I mentioned in section 2.1, this triggers a process of moving the quantified DP each 
girl, resulting in a logical form for the sentence which looks different from its surface 
form. Let us begin with the assumption that the quantified DP moves to a sentence-
initial position, as I discussed in section 2.1. The resulting Lf looks like: 
(16)
This is an interpretable structure. In fact, it is interpretable regardless of whether we 
interpret the definite the mother of x as of type e or of type 〈〈e, t〉, t〉. If [[ the mother 
of x]] is of type e, it combines with the VP of type 〈e, t〉 to form a sentence of type t. 
λ-abstraction then binds the variables in the sentence, resulting in a predicate which 
can combine with the quantified DP. The interpretation is given by: 
(17) each girl〈〈e, t〉, t〉 (λx (the mother of x waved to x)〈e, t〉)
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We get an interpretable structure for this sentence, by leaving the definite description in 
situ, and moving the quantifier each girl to a scope position. We have thus had to apply 
our scoping mechanism Qr to the embedded quantifier, but not the definite descrip-
tion.
What we have shown so far is that we can analyze this example using the e-type analy-
sis, without assigning scope to the definite description. Of course, none of this shows 
that we cannot move the description to a scope position, nor that the descriptions is 
not really a quantifier after all. We could move the definite to a scope position, getting 
a structure like: 
(18)
This assigns the definite description the mother of x narrow scope with respect to the 
quantifier each girl. It makes no sense to assign the description wide scope, but narrow 
scope is sensible, and results in the same truth conditions as the non-scoping interpre-
tation.
This is also an interpretable Lf. In fact, in the Heim and kratzer framework, it is in-
terpretable even if we leave the definite description at type e. The λ-bound node 
λy (y waved to herx) is of type 〈e, t〉. The definite description the mother of x is of type 
e, so they combine. They do so in a different way than we see with quantified DPs in 
scope position. Quantified DPs are functions of type 〈〈e, t〉, t〉, which take as input the 
λ-bound elements of type 〈e, t〉. but so long as we allow sister nodes [α β] to combine 
either by α being an input to β, or vice-versa, we have interpretable structures here. (If 
we take a stricter approach to semantic composition, we might have to adjust the type 
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of the description to quantifier type 〈〈e, t〉, t〉. frameworks which allow type-shifting 
(e.g. Partee 1986) do this easily.)
We can thus apply our syntactic scoping mechanism Qr to the definite description in-
terpreted as type e. Of course, we can also simply treat the as a quantifying determiner, 
semantically on par with each. We now have three viable options: treat the definite 
description as type e and do not assign it scope, treat it as type e but assign it scope 
anyway, or treat it as a quantifier. All are viable. The main moral so far is that the first 
option is just as viable as the others, insofar as this example goes. The example gives us 
no reason to opt for the scoping over the scopeless options.
There might be some general considerations which suggest taking the first—scope-
less—option, if it is available. General parsimony considerations might do this. We 
might prefer theories which only apply mechanisms like Qr for a good reason, and 
we might prefer theories which give expressions lowest-possible type values. If so, then 
our scopeless option looks like the best option, as far as this example goes. but this is 
only one example. Indeed, I shall discuss some other issues in section 5 which might 
make us doubt we can apply parsimony considerations so easily. but nonetheless, the 
example itself does not require the definite description to take scope.
so far, we have seen that in examples like (1), we have to move the embedded quantifier 
each girl to a scope position, but need not move the definite description (if we do not 
want to). but actually, the situation is more complex than this makes it seem. How to 
handle the quantifier is complicated in this case. Though it will not really change our 
view of the behavior of the definite description, it is worth pausing to see why.
In looking at this question, it is worth noting that examples like (1) have been discussed 
at length in the literature on logical form, especially by May (1977, 1985), under the 
name ‘inverse linking’. A typical example is: 
(19) someone from every city despises it.
May noted that the dominant reading (and the only plausible one) of (19) is the inverse 
scope reading; a fact which he used in arguing for Lf as a level of linguistic represen-
tation. to explain these cases, some theory which explains how a quantifier can take 
scope outside of the PP complement of a DP is needed. In cases like (19), this scopes 
the embedded quantifier outside of another quantifier, as it would if we treat definite 
descriptions as quantificational in (1). but if we opt for the in situ treatment of the defi-
nite, the issue of the scope of the embedded quantifier remains the same.
Assigning scope to this quantifier raises a syntactic problem. The analysis I sketched 
above (which is in effect the analysis of inverse linking of May 1977) requires move-
ment of the quantifier each girl out of a subject DP. This sort of movement is generally 
barred by syntax. At the very least, overt movement of this sort leads to ungrammati-
cality, as we see if we try a similar movement with a wh-phrase: 
(20) *Which girl1 the mother of t1 waved to her.
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Though it is a rather technical point in linguistics, this might be a reason to doubt the 
details of the analysis I offered in (16).
two preliminary points should be made about this worry. first, the technical issue 
does not undercut the force of my argument that the e-type analysis, combined with 
off-the-shelf tools from linguistics, handles examples like (1). The technical problem 
applies equally to quantificational and e-type approaches. both approaches need to as-
sign the embedded quantifier wide scope, and doing so in a linguistically acceptable 
way is a problem independent of whether the definite description itself takes scope. 
second, and perhaps more importantly, whether or not Qr—our syntactic scoping 
mechanism—obeys the same syntactic restrictions as overt movement is a hotly de-
bated topic. so, the worry itself hangs on some extremely difficult and far-reaching 
issues in linguistic theory.19
bearing in mind that the issue before us is too technical to resolve here, let me briefly 
sketch one way to approach it. One option for avoiding extraction out of the DP, ex-
plored by May (1985) and by Larson (1985) and Heim & kratzer (1998), is to assign the 
quantifier scope over the DP, rather than the whole sentence. If extraction out of the 
DP is barred for syntactic reasons, perhaps we should move the embedded quantifier 
to a scope position within DP. Assuming we then apply Qr to the larger DP, the result 
would be something like: 
(21)
19 see May & bale (2005) for a survey of work on inverse linking. for overviews of some issues about syntactic 
constraints on Lf movement, see Huang (1995), reinhart (1997), and szabolcsi (2001).
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There may be some good syntactic reasons to prefer this sort of structure (see May 
(1985) and May & bale (2005) for discussion). Interestingly, it obviates the question 
of whether the definite description itself it moved to a scope position. The embedded 
quantifier takes scope over DP, and the whole larger DP structure might scope as well. 
No further question of quantifier scope remains, for the reading in question. 
Even so, this proposal raises a number of semantic problems. The first problem is how 
to interpret the higher DP. How are we to understand a quantifier taking scope over a 
DP? This question is underscored by the fact that we have a type mismatch. On the e-
type analysis of the definite description, the lower λ-bound DP is of type 〈e, e〉, which 
does not combine with the quantified DP of type 〈〈e, t〉, t〉. We face a similar problem 
on a quantification treatment of the definite description. something needs to adjust 
the types within the higher DP, if we are to make semantic sense of it. The natural sug-
gestion, made by Heim and kratzer, is to invoke some type-shifting mechanism in the 
semantics. Another option is, as always, is to see further syntactic structure at Lf which 
has the same effect. Much as we have already seen, such options could be implemented 
whether we opt for an e-type or quantificational treatment of the definite description.
There is a second problem as well. by the lights of many view of the syntax of scope, 
(21) does not allow the quantifier each girl to bind the pronoun her. Thus, any analy-
sis along the lines of (21) will have to say something far-reaching about the syntax of 
scope, or about pronouns. 
This brief glance at the complexities of inverse linking is enough to remind us that cases 
like (1) are very delicate indeed. resolving how the embedded quantifier takes scope 
leads us to a surprising range of difficult problems in the syntax and semantics of quan-
tifiers, of scope, and of binding. 
With this in mind, we may leave example (1) with a guarded conclusion. It shows us 
some hard and interesting things about scope, but they are about the scope of the em-
bedded quantifier. It is compatible with many treatments of the definite description, 
including basically scopeless ones. Thus, it fails to establish that definite descriptions 
enter into the same sorts of quantifier scope interactions as other quantifiers; though in 
the longer run, it is not enough to answer the question of whether definite descriptions 
take scope. I suspect that one of the reasons it has been hard to resolve the question of 
whether definite descriptions take scope is that it is often hard to get a satisfactory ac-
count of how other elements take scope in examples like (1).
4. The copular sentence case
so far, we have looked closely at example (1), and seen that it shows us some inter-
esting things about quantifier scope, but nothing which particularly supports scoping 
over non-scoping theories of definite descriptions. It also reminded us that accurate ac-
counts of scoping behavior can be difficult indeed. What about our next example (2)? 
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It is tempting to group it as on par with (1), as simply showing us a description taking nar-
row scope at Lf with respect to a quantifier which appears inside it in the surface form of 
the sentence. but upon closer inspection, it turns out that (2) raises a number of distinct 
issues. first of all, though it contains a definite description with an embedded quantifier, 
as (1) does, it is importantly different structurally. It is a copular sentence, with form 
[DP is DP], and it contains a relative clause. As we will see, this leads to a very different 
analysis than we gave for (1). In this case, the issues are not simply about where and how 
a quantifier may take scope, but whether we are looking at a scope phenomenon at all. In 
the end, I shall argue that this example is equally compatible with scoping and non-scop-
ing accounts of the definite description. but along the way, we will see how difficult it is to 
spot whether it is the scope of a quantifier that is at issue at all.20
Even though (2) differs from (1) in some ways, we might begin by trying to apply the 
same mechanisms we used to account for (1) to (2). following the proposal in (16), we 
might simply move the embedded quantifier to a sentence-initial scope position. This 
does not resolve the question of whether the definite also scopes, but it does get the 
right truth conditions.
In the inverse linking case, we confronted syntactic reasons to be wary of moving the 
quantifier this way. for (2), this problem is all the more pressing. We would have to 
move the quantifier every Englishman out of the relative clause (who) every Englishman 
loves. but generally, quantifiers do not scope out of relative clauses. for instance, as 
noted by rodman (1976): 
(22) Guinevere has a bone that is in every corner of the house.
This sentence does not seem to allow the sensible reading on which Guinevere (the 
dog, presumably) has, for each corner of the house, a different bone in it. The sentence 
only seems to allow the impossible reading where the bone is in every corner of the 
house, which leaves the scope of the quantifier every corner of the house within the rela-
tive clause that is in every corner of the house. As I mentioned in section 3, it is highly 
contentious exactly which constraints the operation Qr of moving quantifiers at Lf 
obeys. but we should be cautious with any analysis of (2) which scopes a quantifier out 
of a relative clause.21
In the case of (1), we considered ways to scope an embedded quantifier outside a definite 
description which do not violate syntactic constraints on scope. Thus, we retained the 
assumption that the issue is the scope of the quantifier, but tried to refine our account of 
how it scopes. It is doubtful this is the right approach to cases like (2). for one reason, 
20 There is some discussion about whether the phenomenon at work in cases like (2) is restricted to sentences 
involving identity, as well as a certain sort of relative clause. sharvit (1999b) discusses non-identity examples from 
Hebrew, and notes some exceptions for English as well.
21 I should note that there is a large literature on whether indefinites obey these sorts of scope constraints, and 
whether they should be uniformly treated as quantifiers, including Abusch (1994), fodor & sag (1982), king 
(1988), kratzer (1998), reinhart (1997), ruys (1992) and schwarzschild (2002).
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though scoping the embedded quantifier out of the relative clause would work for (2), it 
does not appear to be a general account of sentences of this form. With other embedded 
quantifiers, scoping them out (whether allowed or not) does not get the right truth condi-
tions. for instance, scoping out the embedded quantifier does not get the right reading of 
(23), on either the e-type or quantificational approach to the definite description: 
(23) The woman that no Englishman will invite to dinner is his mother.
a. (e-type) [no Englishman]x [the woman that x will invite for dinner is hisx 
 mother]
b. (Quantificational) [no Englishman]x [the woman that x will invite for dinner]y [y is 
 hisx mother]
(This example is discussed in Hornstein (1984), Jacobson (1994) (who cites Dahl 1981), 
and sharvit (1999b) (who cites von stechow 1990).) 
sentences like (2) and (23) have a kind of functional identity reading. for (2), there 
is a salient function from people (Englishmen) to a woman they will invite to dinner. 
sentence (2) says that for the domain of Englishmen, that function is the mother of 
function. Hence, for every Englishman, the value of the function is his mother. for 
(23), there is a salient function from people to women they will not invite to dinner. 
On at least one reading, (23) says that on the domain of Englishmen, that function is 
again the mother of function. On these readings, (2) can be understood as saying that 
the inviting function and the mother of function on the relevant domain are identical, 
and (23) says the same about the non-inviting function.
Neither analysis (23a) nor (23b) can capture this functional reading. take a situation 
where there is a salient non-inviting function: say that of being the mother-in-law of 
rather than that of being the mother of. but assume also that every Englishman does in-
vite many salient women, including his neighbor and his boss. Intuitively on the read-
ing in question, (23) is false. The quantificational analysis predicts it is true, as there is 
no Englishman such that the unique salient woman he invites to dinner is his mother. 
The e-type analysis predicts it is a presupposition failure (or it is true, if we take a non-
presuppositional variant), and so fares no better.
It so-happens that (2) can be given the right truth conditions by scoping out the em-
bedded quantifier, on either the quantificational or e-type analysis of the definite de-
scription (so long as we work the right salience condition into the uniqueness clause/
presupposition). The cost is scoping out of a relative clause, and that is a problem for 
both analyses. but examples like (23) lead us to think that the underlying issue here is 
not one of the scope of the embedded quantifier at all. rather, it is one of capturing the 
functional readings of these sentences.22
22 Of course, that is not the only problem. It also needs to be explained how the embedded quantifier can bind 
the post-copular pronoun, for instance. but as our concern is with relative scope between the quantifier and the 
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There are a number of proposals for how to do this. I shall mention two recent ones, 
which are fairly typical of the options available. One sort of proposal, developed by 
Jacobson (1994) and sharvit (1999a, 1999b), tries to implement the functional reading 
directly. The details are quite technical, and use very different apparatus than we have 
been exploring here. but the basic idea is that relative clauses are given genuinely func-
tional readings. The definite article still picks out the relevant thing, but in this case, it 
is a function rather than an individual. The whole sentence (2) then winds up saying 
something like: 
(24) the f〈e, e〉 [∀x (woman (f(x))) ∧ ∀x (Englishman(x) → love(x, f (x)))] = mother-of〈e, e〉
to flesh this out, we will have to make heavy use of devices of type-shifting. In particu-
lar, we have to change the type of the to take a functional input of type 〈〈e, e〉, t〉, and 
output the function of type 〈e, e〉. This is a significant step, and indeed, according to 
Jacobson this sort of apparatus implicates a drastically different approach to issues of 
scope and binding than the one I have been assuming here. but for our purposes, we 
may simply note that the hard work is done by the functional account of the relative 
clause. Though some changes need to be made to the semantics of the, they are changes 
about what types of things it picks out.
Thus, if we take this approach, we can still give the definite description a basically sco-
peless treatment. It need not be a quantifier; rather, it can pick out the unique object of 
the right sort. In this case, that object will be of higher type, rather than type e. On the 
other hand, if we like, we can still give the definite a quantificational treatment. but as 
we have seen, assigning scope to the definite is not important to the account sketched 
in (24). In this case, scoping the embedded quantifier outside of the definite description 
is not part of the solution either. According to the proposal we have just glanced at, (2) 
does not really show us anything about quantifier scope interactions at all.
The other sort of proposal which we might apply to (2) seeks to preserve the kinds of 
assumptions we have been making here about scope and binding, and to avoid the 
heavy use of type-shifting operations. for instance, schlenker (2003) suggests an analy-
sis in terms of ‘questions in disguise’. The sorts of functional readings we are concerned 
with go very naturally with certain sorts of questions (as observed by Engdahl 1986): 
(25)  Who is the woman every Englishman loves?
 His mother.
With this in mind, schlenker’s analysis of (2) proposes a logical form which looks very 
roughly like: 
(26) The woman every Englishman loves is his mother.
 a. Answer to [who is the woman every Englishman loves] = [every Englishman 
loves his mother]
definite description, I shall not discuss this further.
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 b. ?x [ [woman every Englishman loves](x) ] = [every Englishman loves his mother]
The crossed-out material is elided. ?x is a concealed wh-operator, like what or who.23
Obviously, quite a bit of syntactic work is needed to derive this sort of logical form. 
Again, I shall skip the details. for our purposes, it will suffice to note that like the previ-
ous analysis, schlenker’s does not indicate a quantificational treatment of the definite 
article. schlenker specifically proposes that in environments like that of (2), the spells 
out the definiteness feature of the concealed wh-operator ?x. When DPs are functioning 
as questions, according to schlenker, the has no place in logical form independently of 
?x. This tells us nothing in particular about the semantics we should apply to the when 
it occupies a D-position in logical form, and gives us no reason to prefer a quantifica-
tional analysis over an e-type analysis.
regardless of which sort of analysis of sentences like (2) is correct, we are safe to con-
clude that they do not give us evidence for a scope-taking analysis of descriptions. both 
analyses we have looked at, in fact, use non-quantificational treatments of the definite 
article. We have stumbled upon a hard case, but not about descriptions, quantifiers, 
and scope, so much as about the structure of certain copular sentences, and the role 
of relative clauses or concealed questions in them. No defense of a quantificational 
view of definite descriptions will be found here. Neither analysis we have considered 
of our copular sentence case clearly precludes a quantificational treatment of definite 
descriptions (at least, when they appear in D-positions in logical form), but neither 
gives us any reason to prefer a quantificational over an e-type analysis. Indeed, we have 
seen that the underlying issue for the copular sentence case is not one of relative scope 
between quantifiers, or quantifiers and descriptions, at all.24
Even more so than with (1), our brief detour into what is needed to account for (2) 
makes vivid just how complicated cases like these can be. cases like (2) and (23) con-
front us with not so much a technical problem about the conditions on scope-taking, 
but a very hard problem of how to generate functional readings. both approaches we 
glanced at go to extreme measures to solve the problem. I noted that these accounts do 
not make any use of quantificational treatments of definite descriptions, and so they 
23 Using a Groenendijk and stokhof-inspired semantics for questions, schlenker avoids the answer to operator in 
logical form. The idea that there is a connection between some DPs and questions finds support in examples like 
these (from Heim 1979):
(i) a. John knows the capital of Italy.
 b. They revealed the winner of the contest.
In the second sentence, for instance, what is revealed is who the winner of the contest is.
24 One other surprising aspect of sentences like (2) is that the embedded quantifier seems able to ‘bind’ across 
sentence boundaries:
(i) a. The woman that every Englishman loves is his mother. He dotes on her.
 b. The woman no Englishman would invite to dinner is his mother. He would not be caught in the same 
 room with her.
This is similar to the phenomenon of telescoping noted by roberts (1989, 1996). It differs in two respects. canoni-
cal examples of telescoping have a universal quantifier with scope over the whole initial sentence. Perhaps more 
importantly, telescoping is often taken to be possible only with universal quantifiers.
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will not give us any evidence in favor of such treatments. but they do show us how dif-
ficult a full account of definite descriptions can become. Deciding how to analyze the 
definite descriptions in these examples requires deciding some difficult issues of how 
to understand functional relative clauses, or concealed functional questions. Even de-
ciding what, if anything, these examples show us about definite descriptions and scope 
requires deciding these difficult and far-ranging issues.
5. Scope or no scope? 
I have now defended my rather narrowly drawn main point: examples like (1) and (2) 
do not support a quantificational account of definite descriptions over an e-type ac-
count. They do not support the view that definite descriptions are basically scope-tak-
ing over a view which interprets them in situ, making them basically scopeless. I have 
been careful to keep this conclusion guarded. Though they do not favor the quantifi-
cational account, these examples do not preclude quantificational analyses that move 
definite descriptions to narrow scope positions.
Along the way, I have also taken pains to point out where our analyses of (1) and (2) 
relate to more general issues in linguistic theory. We have seen that they engage difficult 
questions about quantifier scope and about functional readings of copular sentences. 
As I mentioned at the outset, this goes some way towards showing why the theory of 
definite descriptions has remained a disputed one. It connects with such a wide range 
of complex issues that it resists simple and definitive treatment.
In section 2.1, I sketched a ‘clean and simple’ picture according to which e-type expres-
sions are ‘basically scopeless’—interpreted in situ as arguments—while quantifier-type 
expressions are moved to scope positions by Qr. I have shown here that examples 
(1) and (2) allow such a ‘basically scopeless’ analysis of definite descriptions. When 
it comes to the relative scope of the description and the quantifier in these examples, 
we do not need to assign the description scope. but as I mentioned in section 2.1, 
the clean and simple picture is ultimately too clean and too simple. There are lots of 
reasons to wonder if the e-type analysis really makes descriptions scopeless, touching 
on other matters than relative quantifier scope. In keeping with the observation that a 
wide range of theoretical issues are at stake in the study of descriptions, I shall close 
by pointing out a very different sort of reason to be cautious about uniformly treating 
definite descriptions as arguments.
There are a number of reasons we might think that definite descriptions might be sub-
ject to Qr, even if it is not needed for our examples (1) and (2). One is that descriptions 
pattern with quantifiers in a very different sort of environment than the ones we have 
been examining here: antecedent-contained deletion. consider: 
(27) a. Dulles suspected everyone who Angleton did.
M. Glanzberg  Definite Descriptions and Quantifier Scope: Some Mates Cases Reconsidered
155
 b. Dulles suspected the person who Angleton did.
 c. *Dulles suspected Philby who Angleton did.
It has been argued by May (1985) that a proper account of ellipsis for case like this 
requires Qr to move the embedded quantifier phrase at Lf. The ungrammaticality of 
(27c) is thus predicted, assuming Qr does not apply to names. but then, the grammati-
cality of (27b) indicates that Qr moves the embedded description. Hence, we might 
have to treat definite descriptions as being assigned scope by Qr in some environments 
after all. This leaves open whether they may be treated as e-type expressions that are 
moved to scope positions, or whether they genuinely have to be of quantifier-type. but, 
it indicates they may be subject to Qr regardless.25
In keeping with our moral that deciding whether definite descriptions take scope al-
ways, sometimes, or never requires understanding a wide range of linguistic phenom-
ena, the case of antecedent-contained deletion asks us to consider syntactic constraints 
on ellipsis, not just the interactions of definite descriptions and quantifiers. It gives us 
reason to move very cautiously around questions of whether descriptions take scope, 
regardless of whether they get interpreted as of e-type or quantifier-type.
All this goes to remind us that issues of scope are wide-ranging. Looking at relative 
quantifier scope is not enough to resolve them. but, I have argued, a close look at it in 
cases (1) and (2) shows that the e-type theory remains a viable option.
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